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Abstract From the moment the first Turkish and Moroccan workers migrated to
Europe in the early 1960s, the Turkish and Moroccan states have been concerned with
how to bind emigrated citizens to their country of origin. In this article, we focus on
Islam as a multi-dimensional binding mechanism. Religion is a broad register that links
emotion, affect, and senses of belonging and binds individuals to political and cultural
projects of collective actors and states. As we will demonstrate, it is a field in which
both states and migrants have developed a variety of activities and initiatives, but it is
difficult to single out what pertains to the state and what not. We argue that although
state involvement in these two cases differs markedly, there are some intriguing
parallels when we concentrate on religion. In both cases, religious affiliation is a very
complex source of binding and of fission. State-monitored transnational networks have
been tools of binding, but the same networks have engendered processes of disengage-
ment from the state.
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Introduction
Towards the end of the 1970s, a poster circulated in the Netherlands. On the poster, we
could see a blindfolded man, apparently a prisoner. His head is grabbed by a hand with
razor-sharp nails. On the sleeve of the hand it says: “Amicales, secret police of
Morocco.” The poster was distributed by a committee that wanted to raise awareness
among the Dutch public and the government about alleged control and suppression of
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Moroccan guest workers in Europe by the Moroccan regime of King Hassan II, the
authoritarian king of Morocco in those years. The organization “Amicales” was set up
as an association for Moroccans abroad, but they were accused of spying for the
regime. The association soon became known as “the long arm of King Hassan.”
However, in those days, the public attention for these activities was low.
Governments in Europe tended to consider this an internal Moroccan affair in which
they should not interfere.
A few years later, the Dutch government welcomed the foundation of a branch of a
Turkish state institution, the Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet) in 1983. The
same year, an agreement was signed between the Dutch and Turkish governments to
send imams in order to meet the religious needs of the rapidly growing Turkish Muslim
community in the Netherlands. The same kinds of agreement were established with
other European countries. There was a general political consent that these imams would
preach a “modest Islam” and that they would counter radical tendencies among Turkish
Muslims in Europe. It was the time of the serious international clash between the new
Islamic government in Iran and the West. There was a general fear of emerging
“fundamentalism,” as it was called in those years. European governments with a sizable
Muslim population welcomed the cross-border control of sending states.
Three decades later, the attitude in Europe towards transnational activities and state
involvement has changed dramatically. Two fairly recent incidents may elucidate this.
The first concerns the position of the Dutch MP of the Labor Party, Khadija Arib, of
Moroccan descent. In 2006, she took a seat in the Conseil Consultatif des Droits de
l’Homme, a consultative body for the Moroccan government in human rights issues.
This aroused fierce reactions among Dutch nationalists and right-wing politicians in the
Dutch Parliament, especially the Freedom Party of Geert Wilders, but there were also
politicians of other parties who considered her alignment with the Conseil not appro-
priate for a Dutch MP. She was accused of having close links with the Moroccan
government. According to these critics, she should make an exclusive choice either for
the Netherlands or for Morocco. The incident was part of a more general discussion
about double passports and the impossibility for migrants of Moroccan descent to give
up their Moroccan passports. Even though Arib was cleared from allegations, a number
of right-wing politicians persisted in their opinion that MPs of Moroccan and Turkish
background do have a loyalty problem. For that reason, the candidacy of Arib for
chairing the Dutch Parliament was contested: an MP with a loyalty problem cannot lead
the Dutch Parliament.
The second example concerns the continuous relation between the Turkish Diyanet
and Turkish mosques in the Netherlands. When the report Diyanet was published
(Sunier et al. 2011; see also Sunier and Landman 2014) about the changing relations
between the Directorate and Turkish Muslims in the Netherlands, there were critical
questions in Parliament by Dutch MP’s about the alleged control by the Turkish state of
Muslims in the Netherlands through the Dutch branch of Diyanet. The 30-year-old
arrangement between Turkey and the Netherlands about sending imams was now
presented as something undesired, unprecedented, and utterly problematic.1 A similar
1 See Vermeulen, B (2010) Ankara is baas van Turken in EU’ NRC Handelsblad http://academic.lexisnexis.nl/
(accessed 26 November 2013); Hegener, M. (2013) ‘Erdogan bepaalt niet of Yunus een moslim is’ De
Volkskrant http://academic.lexisnexis.nl/ (accessed 26 November 2013)
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concern was expressed around the involvement in mid-2013 of the then Turkish Prime
Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in the case of the foster child Yunus, born to Turkish
parents, but placed in a foster home in the Netherlands. It aroused fierce reactions, not
so much because of the Turkish protests about the homosexual identity of the foster
parents, but because Turkey interfered in the case. There is a broad public consensus
that a leader of another country should not deal with what was considered a Dutch
domestic affair.
These are just a few of the many examples of the serious concern about foreign
states mingling in issues abroad. As these cases clearly demonstrate, the involvement of
states with the lives of their subjects outside the country is a very sensitive issue that
regularly stirs discussions about territories, jurisdictions, and foreign influence.
Whether we deal with formal regulations for nationality and citizenship, or with
networks, activities, and political affiliations beyond the confines of state borders, the
“long arm” of governments is invoked in debates on citizenship and loyalty and is
generally considered as unacceptable. It would violate national integrity—so the
argument in these debates goes. Cross-border activities of individual migrants are often
considered problematic, temporal survivals from times prior to migration. This is, for
example, the case with the continuous discussion about marriage partners from the
country of origin (Storms and Bartels 2008). According to the dominant integration
paradigm, ties with the country of origin are considered counterproductive practices
that hamper integration into host societies and should be discouraged as much as
possible. In the latest policy report on integration of 2011, the Dutch government
explicitly emphasized that building a national community and diminishing immigration
go hand in hand (Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken 2011). The orientation of an
increasing number of inhabitants with a Turkish or Moroccan background towards their
countries of origin is considered a problem for societal cohesion (SCP 2012, p. 90).
Transnational networks and contacts abroad continue to pose a challenge for integra-
tion, but they are manageable.
The role of states in transnational activities is, however, considered to be of a
different nature and is generally met with suspicion and even outrage.2 The involve-
ment of foreign states in the lives of their overseas subjects is a source of contention. It
lays bare the inherent tensions that exist in all migratory cycles across the globe
between sending states and migrants that seek to sustain transnational linkages as long
as possible and receiving states that embark on a domestication and integration program
to turn migrants into citizens (see Sunier 2014).
Transnationalism and nation-building
In this article, we address the involvement of the Turkish and Moroccan states in the
lives of migrants and their offspring. Since the moment the first Turkish and Moroccan
workers migrated to Europe in the early 1960s, the Turkish and Moroccan states have
been concerned with how to bind emigrated citizens to their country. At the same time,
2 In a Dutch newspaper article, Santing and Sprangers argue that the monitoring activities of the Turkish state
among Turks in Europe negatively affect the integration of Turks into Dutch society. They urge the Dutch
government to “keep the Turkish state at distance” (NRC 02-03-2013).
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receiving states in Europe in the course of years have put more effort into developing
policies towards gradual absorption into societies of residence and to disengage
migrants from the country of origin. This has also been the case with the
Netherlands. Turks and Moroccans constitute the largest groups of migrants in the
country. They also constitute the largest groups of migrants with an Islamic background
(CBS 2013).3 They are a prime focus of policy reports and public debates (SCP 2012).
Comparison between these two cases is instructive in a number of ways. Moroccans
and Turks have a relatively long migration history in the Netherlands. The present
population is very diverse with respect to background, social position, migratory
background, and cultural outlook. Migrants have built up an extended and very diverse
organizational landscape in the country. Both Turkey and Morocco have a long history
of transnational relationships with the migrant populations in the Netherlands
(Landman 1992; Sunier 1996; Rath et al. 2001; Maussen 2006; Sunier et al. 2011;
Bouras 2012). There are also important differences in the modes of involvement of the
two states, as we will demonstrate in this article.
We focus on Islam as an important multi-dimensional binding mechanism. Together
with nationalism, religion is the most effective way to attach migrants to their countries
of origin. Religion is a broad register that links emotion, affect, and senses of belong-
ing, and binds individuals to political and cultural projects of collective actors and
states (Levitt 1998; Vásquez and Marquardt 2003; Werbner 2002). As we will dem-
onstrate, it is a field in which both states and migrants have developed a variety of
activities and initiatives, but it is difficult to single out what pertains to the state and
what not. 4
We will compare the Turkish and Moroccan cases by elaborating two arguments.
Firstly, we critically take issue with the dominant integration paradigm characteristic of
much of the migration literature and policy reports that transnational networks, prac-
tices, and orientations of former migrants hamper integration into host society. Wimmer
and Glick Schiller argue that studies on migration processes have been narrowed down
to the question of how nation-states integrate migrants. They show how the historically
grown focus in social science on the nation-state over the past two centuries has defined
the very concept of migration. Consequently, transnationalism as an aspect of migratory
cycles is still caught in a national paradigm (Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2002, p. 324).5
Similarly, the study of Islam in Europe has implicitly become synonymous with
studying how individual states, with their respective modes of incorporation and
integration, nationalize Islam and integrate Muslims.6 We question this limited scope
and we take up the concept of “simultaneity” as our point of departure (Levitt and Glick
Schiller 2004). Migrants can participate fully in the host society while being oriented
towards the country of origin. We cannot fully understand what goes on in the lives of
individuals when we take national boundaries as the only point of reference.
“Migrants are often embedded in multi-layered, multi-sited transnational social fields”
3 For the 2013 statistics, please see; http://statline.cbs.nl (accessed on 27 November 2013)
4 The findings on Turkey are based on a research project carried out in the past years on state activities in the
Netherlands (see Sunier et al. 2011). The Moroccan case is based on recent research in Morocco and the
Netherlands by Nadia Bouras, Merel Kahmann, and Ellen van de Bovenkamp.
5 To take the nation-state as the self-evident site of analysis has been referred to as methodological nationalism
(see also Beck 2000; Chernilo 2006).
6 For a discussion, see Sunier (2013).
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(ibid, p. 1003). There is an extensive body of literature addressing the dialectical
relationship between the fixing and flow inherent in migration cycles (see e.g., Basch
et al. 1994; Smith and Guarnizo 1998; Vertovec 2009; Salazar 2010). This literature
convincingly demonstrates that there is no contradiction between transnational activities
and practices on the one hand and processes of local rooting on the other.
Our second argument and main focus of this article concerns the role of states in
transnational activities. We argue that there is no sharp distinction to be drawn between
private and state transnational practices. It is often impossible to determine what state
activity is and what is initiated by ordinary people. The increasingly diversified
transnational field includes a wide variety of forms, practices, goals, strategies, and
motivations (Vertovec 2009). The analytical distinction between state activities and
those of the population obfuscates the dynamics at work in this field (Hansen and
Stepputat 2001, p. 25). Van Klinken and Barker argue that, “states may portray
themselves as generic and immensely powerful in their own right, but in reality they
are intimately embedded in their societies in historically contingent ways” (2009, p. 2).
We argue that this also holds true for transnational activities and networks. Any proper
analysis of transnational networks must include this entire field. A distinction between
the state as the domain of laws, rules, and institutionalized power as contrasted by
private initiatives as the domain of contingent, volatile, and personal exchange over-
looks the entanglement and the societal embeddedness of both state and private
transnational activity.
The state is a significant cultural agent. In the last decades, as a consequence of
processes of globalization and international migration, nation-states have redressed their
role as active cultural and social agents in continuously evolving discursive fields (see
Geschiere and Meyer 1998). As Rose and Miller have argued, “It is in this discursive
field that ‘the state’ itself emerges as a historically variable linguistic device for
conceptualizing and articulating ways of ruling” (Rose and Miller 1992, p. 177). Most
nation-states in Europe have reemphasized their role as a powerful force in cultural
processes and a meaningful source of legitimacy in a time when this very legitimacy of
nation-states as providers of political meaning is under pressure (Geschiere 2009;
Verkaaik 2010). As such, nation-states are cultural projects that present themselves
through particular narratives in particular sites. This could be observed first and foremost
in the debate about the unification of Europe and the integration of migrants. Nation-
states, through different political agents articulate specific national narratives, concepts
of citizenship, and models of integration. But instead of articulating simplistic messages
of patriotism or nationalism, their civic and political messages have become far more
subtle and sophisticated, concerned with seemingly universal values of democratic
participation, supra-national inclusiveness, and the peaceful resolution of all conflicts
(Baumann 2004; Shils 1994). Nation-states today develop a variety of ways to translate
nationalist exclusivism into inclusivist narratives of participation; integration and iden-
tification (Schiffauer 2008; see also Anderson 1991, p. 6). We consider religion a crucial
constituent component in this respect.
We further contend that transnational activities are inextricably linked with
nation-building. Modern technological means in combination with the gradual
deregulation and privatization of tasks that traditionally resorted under direct control
of the state have resulted in an externalization of statecraft. Spijkerboer (2011) has
shown how the modern state has outsourced and exported border control. In other
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words, where traditionally the control of national states ended where state borders were
located, today’s technologies of control can be found anywhere. We argue that the
externalization of statecraft is not just a matter of legislation and policing borders, but
also of cultural projects (see e.g., Geschiere 2009; Duyvendak and Scholten 2011). An
instructive example of the externalization of the national cultural project is the imple-
mentation by the Dutch government of the legal condition that potential immigrants
should already pass integration exams before entering the country.7
We can observe an intriguing paradox in the ways modern states operate
transnationally in their role as agents of a national cultural project. Modern technology
and means of communication have enabled states to outsource, externalize, and
digitalize activities designed to strengthen the domestic cultural project of the nation-
state. Transnational activities are an inherent device of that process, but these activities
must be in tune with the developments among the migrant population abroad. States
cannot ignore the complex dynamics in which their former subjects live. In the
following sections, we will dwell on these transnational activities by analyzing how
the Turkish and Moroccan states operate in the field of Islam.
Turkey
One of themost important devices of nation-building of the Turkish state is the institution
of Diyanet: the Directorate of Religious Affairs. The official task given to Diyanet when
it was established in 1924—about 6 months after the foundation of the Turkish
Republic—was threefold: (a) to administer the affairs of the Islamic faith and the
concomitant practices and arrangements, (b) to illuminate society about religion, and
(c) to administer places of worship. This threefold task has since then been stated in
several official documents, such as Law 633 of 2 July 1965. This legal text describing the
tasks has remained unchanged until today.8 Diyanet is mentioned briefly in the consti-
tutions of 1924, 1961, and 1982. The 1961 Constitution had organized Diyanet as a
constitutional institution and all its staff members became civil servants. The 1982
Constitution mentions Diyanet in article 136; this article states that Diyanet is part of
the general administration (genel idare, referring to institutions that are directly linked to
the government) and that it functions in accordance with the principle of secularism,
staying out of all political ideas and opinions, and identifies national solidarity and unity
as its primary aim (Sunier et al. 2011, p. 32). These tasks reflected the close ties between
religion and nationalism that were now propagated. Diyanet had to “protect the Turkish
national identity” (Zürcher and Van der Linden 2004, p, 110; Poulton 1997, p. 185–187).
The link between Islam and Turkish identity is certainly not self-evident. The
association between Islam and Turkish history and ethnicity has always been contested.
There is a considerable proportion of Turks who refute this link and argue that Islam is
alien to Turkish identity. The connection between Islam and Turkish identity is a
specific cultural project dating back long before the establishment of the Turkish
republic in 1923. The entanglement of Turkish nationalism and Sunni Islam had
7 http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/onderwerpen/inburgering-en-integratie (accessed on 27 November 2013)
8 See, for instance: http://www.diyanet.gov.tr/english/tanitim.asp?id=4; Law 633: http://www.ekanun.net/633-
sayili-kanun/index.html (accessed on 7 July 2013)
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already been propagated in the course of the nineteenth century. For instance, Ziya
Gökalp (1876–1924), a leading thinker of Turkish nationalism argued that “the nation
would be vitalized only if ‘true’ Islam could replace superstitious beliefs which […]
were caused by external factors, such as the influence of Arab culture or corrupt clergy”
(Azak 2010, p, 6–7). From the establishment of Diyanet onwards, attempts to “Turkify”
or “purify” Islam (or Islamizing Turkishness) also started to appear in publications of
Diyanet.9 These publications illustrate that the elements of a synthesis between Turkish
nationalism and Islam were discussed and distributed long before the 1970s. However,
a coherent political ideology, widespread popular and political support, and a “histor-
ical” legitimation were lacking until then.
But, in the 1970s and 1980s, a political movement embracing Islam and Turkish
nationalism acquired political influence, especially after the coup of 1980. General
Kenan Evren, the leader of the junta, did not only ban most non-nationalistic religiously
oriented parties, but also unleashed an ideological offensive, in which Islam played a
central role. The Islam that was officially approved and propagated by the military
leadership combined Turkish nationalism with Islam. The ideology was called the
Türk-Islam Sentezi (Turkish-Islam Synthesis). Kafesoğlu has developed and elaborated
this ideology in the 1970s. It postulated that Islam had a special appeal to Turks, since
the origins of Islam of the prophet Mohammed had a lot in common with the culture of
the Central Asian Turkish peoples. They shared a high regard for justice, monotheism,
a belief in the immortal soul, and a strong devotion to family and decency. Therefore, it
was the Turkish people’s mission to be exceptional “soldiers of Islam.” For the
supporters of this ideology, Islam and Turkish nationalism were inextricably linked to
modern Turkish culture (Zürcher and Van der Linden 2004, p. 108–109). 10 The
activities of Diyanet must be understood against this background. Historically, the
position of Diyanet has always been complex. On the one hand, it has been founded as
an institution of control on religious activities, but on the other hand, it is meant to
represent the population of Turkey. When Diyanet extended its activities abroad in the
early 1980s, its position became even more complex.
Diyanet in the Netherlands
There were mainly two reasons for Diyanet to extend its activities to European countries
with a large Turkish immigrant population, such as the Netherlands. In general, Diyanet
reacted to the need for religious services and accommodation in the Netherlands.
Towards the end of the 1970s, the number of Turkish Muslims increased considerably
11 and, accordingly, their need for accommodation grew. The second motivation could
be described as a “competitive”move, though some would say “protective” act, against
non-official Turkish Islamic movements and ideologies—similar to their motivations in
Turkey (Sunier et al. 2011, p. 55). In Turkey, only mosques under supervision of Diyanet
were allowed; facilities run by non-official Sunni movements like Milli Görüş, the
Gülen movement, and the Süleymancıs were illegal.
9 For instance, the works of Ahmet Hamdi Akseki, like his Askere din kitabı (religion book for soldiers),
published in 1925.
10 Text based on Kafesoğlu (1985).
11 In 1970, there were around 30,000 people, while in 1980, their number had increased to 125,000. For an
overview, see http://statline.cbs.nl/ (accessed on 27 November 2013).
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Since the end of the 1970s, Diyanet founded its own umbrella organizations in the
Netherlands: the Turkish Islamic Cultural Foundation (TICF), founded in 1979, and the
Dutch Islamic Foundation (ISN), founded in 1982. Compared to other Turkish Islamic
movements, the position of Diyanet in the Netherlands is unique because of its relation
with the Turkish state and because of the division of tasks and responsibilities between the
two organizations in the Netherlands: the TICF and the ISN. Since 1979, the TICF
operated as the representative of the Turkish Muslim population and as a kind of grass-
roots organization. When the ISN was founded in 1982, however, this was an effort to
organize the same population in a more centralized way, formally controlled by Diyanet
officials in Ankara, and chaired by the religious counselor, the müşavir of the Turkish
Embassy in TheHague, the formal representative of Diyanet (Sunier et al. 2011, p. 55–56).
The two umbrella organizations agreed on a general division of labor: the ISN was
responsible for theological issues and formal religious duties and services whereas the
TICF organized social and cultural activities and represented its members in local
issues. Until recently, this division of labor and responsibilities functioned relatively
well. In recent years, however, the ISN seems to be shifting—or rather extending—its
activities towards the cemaat, the community of believers, thus gradually bringing the
TICF under the ISN’s control (Sunier et al. 2011: 56).
The ISN holds office in The Hague. According to the statutory chart, its aim is to
“create and maintain opportunities and facilities for Muslims in the Netherlands to
enable them to fulfill their religious duties, to improve the position of the Turkish
Muslim community in the Netherlands, and provide facilities for the spiritual develop-
ment of Muslims.” These aims have not changed since 1982, the year of its foundation,
and can easily be found in sources like the ISN website or in its periodicals.12 Under the
heading of faaliyetler (activities to meet those goals), the ISN lists 27 activities13, which
are basically similar to those in a document dating from 1988. Among other things, it is
clearly stated that the ISN should not interfere in political affairs of any sort. In short:
on paper, the position, responsibilities, and activities of ISN have not changed, but in
practice, they did.
Nation-building and the everyday reality of transnational networks
Turkish Muslim organizations in the Netherlands and elsewhere in Europe can only
partially be compared to those in Turkey. In order to understand organizational and
other developments with respect to Islam, it is important to consider the fundamental
changes that took place after migration. This is especially the case with respect to the
activities initiated by these organizations. Initially, activities were mainly oriented
towards the preservation of links with Turkey; however, with the transformation of
the Turkish Muslim population from migrants to post-migrants, many organizations
gradually shifted their policies. According to Azak, “the shift from a mosque-oriented
Islam towards an Islam that spreads itself in the broader public sphere” is an important
development in the Netherlands (2009, p. 79). However, it is important to note that
Azak explicitly refers to non-ISN organizations in the Netherlands, implying that such a
shift does not apply to (or only minimally concerns) the ISN: “Members of Turkish
12 For instance: http://www.diyanet.nl/vakfin-kurulus-amaclari/ (accessed on 7 July 2013)
13 Ibidem.
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Muslim organizations like Milli Görüş, the Gülen movement and the Süleymancıs
participate in the democratic civil society, and are even competing with each other in
obtaining their share of governmental funds aimed at stimulating integration. This
competition leads to civil activism, beyond the level of mosque organizations, and,
accordingly, to an increased participation of Turkish migrants in public life” (2009,
p. 79). However, we argue that the same shift is now taking place in the Diyanet
organizations as well.
All Turkish Muslim organizations in the Netherlands first and foremost provide
religious services and accommodation. In that respect, there has always been a fierce
competition for rank-and-file members between several movements operating among
Turkish Muslims. The organizations that resort under Diyanet have also primarily been
founded for that purpose, but the relation with the Muslim population was always rather
formal and distanced. Recently, we have observed a shift within Diyanet towards a
stronger link with the Turkish Muslim population. We have called this
vermaatschappelijking (a stronger emphasis on the social functions and role of Islam)
(Sunier et al. 2011, p. 76). In order to determine whether the aforementioned “shift from a
mosque-oriented Islam towards an Islam spreading itself in the broader public sphere”
applies to the ISN as well, it is important to pay attention to the activities of ISN. If we
look at the statutory chart, it is possible to make a (albeit artificial) division between
“religious” and “social” activities. Some activities seem to be aimed more at facilitating
religion than at “spreading Islam to a broader public sphere.” Examples of those religious
services include providing religious information to Muslims in the Netherlands; posting
religious staff abroad; developing activities related to the Hajj (pilgrimage); facilitating
assistance in connection with circumcision and weddings; offering assistance with the
transport ofmortal remains of deceased (Turkish)Muslims to Turkey; educating religious
staff; Quran and language courses; accepting and collecting donations, in money and in
kind, and dividing and spending donations, such as fitre (alms at the end of the fasting
month Ramadan) and zakat (a 40th part of the income as “alms”); and obtaining property
“at the service of the objectives of the foundation.”14
Lately, the ISN seems to be more oriented towards “the broader public sphere” and the
(intra- and inter-religious) “dialogue.” Examples of this social dimension include providing
social and cultural services and assistance to (Turkish) Muslims living in the Netherlands;
organizing radio and television broadcastings to inform people about Islam; working
together with churches and other religious organizations in the Netherlands; stimulating
and coordinating the teaching of Islam and scholarly research; founding and administrating
schools that provide Islamic education; translating, printing, and publishing books about
Quran sciences and other Islamic sciences and arts; opening and maintaining libraries;
organizing conferences, seminars, and contests on Islamic topics; and the organizing of,
and participation in, social, cultural, scholarly, and sports events.15
Since all these activities have changed little on paper since the 1980s and because
we have observed visible changes in the actual practices of the ISN, it is important to
analyze the specific interpretations and implementation process of these activities in
concrete situations (Sunier et al. 2011, p. 78). Therefore, we will provide two small case
studies on a local level.
14 http://www.diyanet.nl/vakfin-kurulus-amaclari/ (accessed on 7 July 2013).
15 Ibidem.
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Two cases: Kocatepe mosque and Mevlana mosque in Rotterdam
In order to better understand the “Umwelt” of local mosques, two examples in Rotterdam
are instructive, a city with more than 40 mosques, of which 6 are ISN mosques.16 The
Kocatepe mosque is located in the Afrikaanderwijk, a so-called “multicultural” quarter in
Rotterdam-Zuid (South). The mosque is situated in an old monumental building, which
was built in the 1920s and formerly used as a school. The Mevlana mosque is located in
Rotterdam-West, in a quarter that, like Rotterdam-Zuid, also has a high proportion of
Muslim inhabitants. TheMevlana mosquewas built in 2001 and is one of the few “newly
built” mosques in the city (Sunier et al. 2011, p. 128).
The organizations running the Kocatepe and Mevlana mosques are daughter organiza-
tions of the ISN. The imams are Turkish citizens and are working as expatriates, employed
by the Turkish government. The day-to-day management, however, lies in the hands of a
local board consisting of volunteers, who, during interviews, emphasized the importance of
local decision-making processes and the relative autonomy from activities run by the ISN
in The Hague. They considered this important, as they were involved in several kinds of
neighborhood activities which required a thorough familiarity with local political dynam-
ics. Both the Kocatepeand the Mevlana mosques are more than mere houses for prayer. In
addition to the prayer rooms, they have board rooms, a conference room, rooms for the
elderly, youth, women and girls, Internet facilities, class rooms, a small library and study
facility, a kitchen, a canteen, and even a hairdresser. Kocatepe opened a youth club a few
years ago: a non-alcohol hang out place for Saturday nights, and watching—Dutch or
Turkish—football matches; events supervised by a volunteer appointed by the mosque,
who is familiar with the neighborhood (Sunier et al. 2011, p. 129).
The Kocatepe and Mevlana mosques are both open 7 days a week, during prayer
times, but also for courses and social activities. The general activities organized are as
follows: praying five times a day, Friday sermons, Quran classes, festivities on religious
holidays, meetings organized around various topics like health or social problems,
visiting the sick, and co-organizing (with the ISN) the yearly pilgrimage. The women’s
department has several separate activities, such as language courses, Quran classes, and
also sewing classes and “women only” swimming lessons. On a regular basis, guests
are invited and social gatherings organized. Special activities are also organized for
youth. According to a board member of Kocatepe, “the aim is to keep youngsters away
from the street and to prevent derailment.” The youth have their own rooms and board;
among other activities, they undertake visiting the cinema, playing movies, organizing
theater plays, watching football matches, bowling, karting, camping, and table tennis.
And last but not least, Kocatepe has its own football club, R.V.V. Kocatepe, which has
22 teams.17 They regularly join the national football competition. Both visitors of the
mosques and private sponsors finance most of the above-mentioned activities. These
activities are therefore largely locally based (Sunier et al. 2011, p. 129–130).
The huge variety of locally based activities outside the strictly religious sphere
creates bridges to the neighborhood and social environments of the Kocatepe and
Mevlana mosques. One of the most concrete and visible elements of this are the various
media (brochures) displayed at the entrance of the mosques. For instance: information
16 http://www.diyanet.nl/hdv-cami-hizmetleri/sube-cami-adresleri/ (accessed on 7 July 2013).
17 http://www.rvvkocatepe.nl/ (accessed on 7 July 2013).
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about language courses, promotional brochures about insurances and mortgage, invi-
tations for cultural events, information about health care and social problems, and even
pamphlets promoting a car repair garage. All these activities and announcements
indicate that the role of the mosque in the local community exceeds that of religious
issues (Sunier et al. 2011: 133).
Morocco
Although state involvement in the Moroccan case differs markedly from the Turkish
case, there are some intriguing parallels when we concentrate on religion. As in the case
of Turkish migrants, Moroccan migrants started to arrive in the Netherlands towards the
end of the 1960s. The Dutch economy was booming and there was a lack of labor
workers, while Morocco was suffering from unemployment. Morocco had acquired
independence from France in 1956 and was struggling to keep the country united and
progressing. The young Moroccan monarch Hassan II came to power only a few years
after independence after the sudden death of his father, King Mohamed V. He used
religion as an instrument to legitimate and reinforce his authority. By using the term
Amir al-mu’minin, Commander of the Faithful, the king adds a religious aura to his
status. He also made sure that he was present at public religious ceremonies, and that
they were broadcasted. When Hassan II survived the coups d’état of 1971 and 1972,
this was said to be thanks to his baraka, his godly blessing (Laurent 1993; Belal 2012).
As in the case of Turkish migrants, Moroccan Muslims have been active in
establishing religious institutions in the Netherlands. At first, Moroccans gathered at
work or in their homes to pray, but after a few years, they created their own mosque.
The first Moroccan mosque in the Netherlands was opened in 1974, in the cellar of a
church in the center of Amsterdam.
It was also at this time that the Amicales started to become operational. The
Amicales were Moroccan organizations in different towns in Europe founded to help
Moroccan migrants, but which actually functioned as control agencies for the makhzen,
the Moroccan government, and the state security apparatus. The first meeting of the
Amicales in the Netherlands took place in the mosque in Amsterdam. For migrants, this
mosque represented more than a prayer room; it was a meeting place where people
gathered to exchange the latest gossip, eat together, or organize language classes
(Landman 1992; De Koning, 1994; Maussen 2006). But with the strong presence of
the Amicales, it also became the place where representatives of the Moroccan govern-
ment could keep themselves informed about the political affiliations of Moroccans in
the Netherlands and about the contacts Moroccans established with one another. Some
visitors openly criticized the presence of Moroccan government officials and Amicales
members. Board members of the mosque who had fled the repressive Moroccan regime
argued that the mosque should be a non-political, neutral place.
A year after the first meeting of the Amicales had taken place at the mosque in
Amsterdam, Dutch and Moroccan leftist activists founded the Komitee Marokkaanse
Arbeiders in Nederland (KMAN), the Committee of Moroccan Workers in the
Netherlands. Soon, the Moroccan community in the Netherlands became divided into
those belonging to the Amicales and those supporting the KMAN. The struggle between
leftist activist and royalists that took place in Morocco was extended to the Netherlands.
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It was only in the 1990s that a political transition towards democratization, freedom
of expression, and press freedom took place in Morocco. As a result, the sharp political
polarization gradually gave way to a highly fragmented organizational landscape
(Bouras 2012). An important consequence was that the role of the Moroccan state
became more ambiguous and diversified.
Offer and demand
The involvement of the state in religious affairs was not just a matter of control. There
was a need among the poorly educated migrant population for trained religious
personnel. They turned to Morocco for help. In 1970, a delegation of Moroccan imams
arrived in the Netherlands to offer religious accommodation during the fasting month of
Ramadan, a period of heightened religious consciousness and practice. Later,
Moroccans started to invite imams to come to the Netherlands through their own
network, to avoid state interference. The content of the Friday sermons delivered by
imams who are appointed by the Moroccan state, is controlled by the Moroccan
government and many Dutch Moroccans resented this. The majority of Moroccans in
the Netherlands originate from the northern Rif region, known for its antiroyalist
sentiments. There has always been suspicion within the Moroccan community about
the intentions of authorities, and most Moroccans did not want to have anything to do
with state-sponsored organizations or activities. But at the same time, it was difficult for
them to establish the necessary facilities to carry out the Islamic duties (Bouras 2012).
Moroccan mosques in the Netherlands operate independently from one another.
Although there is some cooperation between associations of Moroccan Muslims, there
is no central Islamic platform in the Netherlands representing them nationally: “The
Union of Moroccan Muslim Organisations in the Netherlands has an unconsolidated
structure, which is so loose that it cannot even tell itself how many mosques adhere to
it” (Douwes 2009, p. 91). But even though the educational level of the migrants’
descendants was much higher than that of their parents, there still was a lack of
religious knowledge badly needed to tackle the complex issues that Muslims living
in a non-Muslim environment may have to deal with. Because the Moroccan commu-
nity was not organized in this respect, it was not surprising that it turned to Morocco for
religious orientation.
Burials are a clear example of how a specific demand triggered the involvement of
the state. The first groups of Moroccan workers in the Netherlands thought they would
eventually return to Morocco. Therefore, Moroccans who passed away in the
Netherlands were buried in Morocco. But even when this migration took on a perma-
nent character, Moroccans continued to bury their dead in Morocco, as there were few
facilities for Islamic interment in the Netherlands. Only recently, several Dutch under-
takers have started to propose more facilities for Islamic funerals (Kadrouch-Outmany
2013). For decades, it was mostly thanks to the Moroccan state that Moroccan migrants
were able to bury their dead following the Islamic traditions: to be able to send money
to family members in Morocco, virtually all Moroccan migrants had opened a bank
account with a Moroccan bank in the Netherlands, which included insurance for burial
in Morocco.
During the 1970s and 1980s, the Amicales helped the Moroccan communities
abroad with these kinds of practical matters. It is not clear to which extent the members
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of the Amicales all considered themselves political supporters of the Moroccan
regime. Apparently, some members of the Amicales essentially saw themselves
as active members of civil society, more than as political supporters of the
Moroccan regime. Mohamed Stitou, a former president of the Amicales, stated
in 1976, “Our main goal is to preserve the Islam for Dutch Moroccans. We are
about to create a third mosque. We have founded an Arabic school, and we
have plans to create a Muslim cemetery and to get permission from the abattoir
for ritual slaughtering.” But he also said that Moroccans should refrain from
political activities, as “they don’t know what they’re talking about” (cited in
Bouras 2012, p. 137).
State security threatened by Islamist terrorism
During the 1990s, Islamist terrorism started to become a serious threat. In 1994, two
tourists were killed and several others were wounded in an armed attack in tourist
hotspot Marrakech. As El-Katiri states, “Moroccan authorities were also alarmed by the
involvement of individuals with a Moroccan background in different terror acts around
the world, who were perceived as threatening the image of the country which had
historically defined itself through its moderate and liberal interpretations of Islam and
its Sufi Muslim orders, as well as being a popular European tourist destination”
(El-Katiri 2013, p. 66). After the Casablanca attacks of 2003, in which 46 people were
killed, Morocco rapidly introduced a new religious policy, for which it had already
started to make plans in the preceding years.
The Ministry of Religious Affairs was allowed more funds. The Minister of
Religious Affairs, Ahmed Toufiq, who was appointed in 2002, is a member of the
Boudchichiya, a famous Sufi brotherhood. This is not a coincidence, as Sufism is being
promoted as a soft Islam, which has the ability to unite people of different faiths. The
current king, Mohamed VI, who took over power after the death of his father in 1999,
wants to emphasize that the Moroccan Islam is tolerant and kind-hearted. He considers
the radical, orthodox Islam as a phenomenon that has been imported into Morocco and
has its origins outside the country (Darif 2010; Zemni 2006). To counter the prolifer-
ation of homemade fatwas, issued by self-appointed fuqaha, Islamic jurists, in remote
corners of the Moroccan kingdom, a “High Council of Ulama,” religious scholars, was
created. In 2010, the ministry also founded the European Council for Moroccan Ulama,
based in Brussels (Darif; Zemni; Koksal 2009). All these changes reconfirmed the
strong link between the monarchy and Islam.
Over the past few years, Morocco has heavily invested in better education of
religious staff, which is seen as a key to prevent misjudgment and radicalism
(El-Katiri 2013, p. 58). In 2008, the Moroccan government invited 40 imams from
the Netherlands to Morocco, where they followed a 1-day course about recent devel-
opments in the religious field in Morocco and how to cope with Islamist extremism.
This journey provoked a controversy in the Netherlands. Dutch politicians were afraid
that the invitation of the imams would be another attempt of the Moroccan government
to control Moroccan communities abroad (Hirsch Ballin wil uitleg, 2008). However,
efforts such as these do not necessarily obstruct Dutch policies. Dutch politicians seem
to have become aware of this now that they share a growing concern with Morocco.
Since the expansion of the Islamic State and the relatively large number of Moroccans
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and Moroccan Dutchmen and women to Syria, Morocco and the Netherlands have a
common goal: fight religious extremism. They have been intensifying their cooperation
in this field. 18
While the Moroccan state sees religion as an important element in the bond between
Dutch Moroccans and Morocco, it does not promote religion in a specific way and
there is no particular religious policy aimed at MRE (Marocains Résidents à l’Étranger,
or Moroccans living abroad). Although the function of Amir al-mu’minin legitimates
his position as monarch, Mohamed VI adopts a different policy than his father and
strengthens his authority essentially by extending his economic power. Therefore, the
ministry for MRE is mainly focused on economic issues and tries to stimulate European
Moroccans to invest in the Moroccan economy. Even religious policies must be
understood in this light. A harmonic integration of migrants into their host countries,
and the avoidance of a scenario of clashing perceptions, is of pivotal economic
importance to the Moroccan government (El-Katiri 2013).
First Muslim, then Moroccan
Moroccans see themselves as Muslim in the first place (Ayadi et al. 2007). Their
Islamic identity is more important than their Moroccan identity. This focus on the
Islamic part of their identity is stronger in the Netherlands and is something Muslim
minorities in Europe have in common (see for example Buitelaar 2009; DeHanas
2015). Therefore, one might expect that the affiliation with Morocco does not play a
role in the religious practices of Dutch-Moroccan Muslims in the Netherlands. But,
even if Moroccan Dutchmen refuse direct intervention of the Moroccan regime in their
religious activities, they look to Morocco for religious guidance, as the Islamic madhab
or school to which they adhere is the Malekite one, which is mainly practiced in
Northern Africa. While some Muslim migrants in Europe adopt Saudi Arabia as their
main religious reference, the Wahhabite Islam which is practiced by the Saudis is
considered as too rigid and too extremist by most Moroccans, even if they do respect
Saudi Arabia, the beholder of the holy city of Mecca, as a center of religious
importance (Himeur 2008; Chaarani 2004).
On important feast days such as Aid Sghir, at the end of the month of Ramadan, or
Aid Kbir, the Feast of the Sacrifice, Moroccans, both in Morocco and in Europe, switch
on the television and tune into the Moroccan national television channel. They not only
listen to Quranic verses being recited, but also see the Moroccan king deliver a speech,
perform his prayers, or slaughter a sheep. In this way, monarchy and religion continue
to be linked.
But on the Internet, it is the Wahhabite Islam that is most present. Through new
media, which is where most youngsters turn to when they are looking for answers to
religious questions, Wahhabism is a strong competitor to Malikism. Concerned by this
development, Morocco has made important investments in the religious field. As part
of religious reforms in Morocco, a channel entirely dedicated to religious issues was
created. Its name, “Assadissa,” the sixth, does not only refer to its place in the
Moroccan broadcasting network, but of course also—essentially—to the Moroccan
18 Schmachtel 2010; Marokko wil Nederland helpen, 2015; Nederland en Marokko werken samen tegen
radicalisering, 2015).
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monarch. According to El-Katiri, “the Assadissa TV, with its images, and sometimes
with very simple language has made great effect on explaining the Moroccan Islam to
millions of Moroccan citizens” (El-Katiri 2013, p. 62). To promote a tolerant Islam and
to counter religious extremism, king Mohamed VI has recently opened the institute for
the education of imams and murchidates (female religious guides). This institution is
mainly destined for African imams, to support Morocco’s economic expansion in
Africa, but apart from several hundred Malian, Guinean and Ivorian imams, several
dozen French and Belgian imams will also be trained here. The Dutch minister of
Social Affairs has said that the training of Dutch imams in Morocco may be envisaged
(Nederland en Marokko werken samen tegen radicalisering, 2015).
Legal ties
An important aspect of the entanglement of state and private transnational connections
concerns the Moroccan family law, the so-calledMudawana. This law is directly drawn
from the Quran and the Sunna. Towards the end of the 1990s, the Moroccan king took
the initiative to change the Mudawana. This led to much controversy, as many
Moroccans believed that this law, inspired by the Quran, could not be changed. The
king then instaured a special committee of religious experts to draw up a new family
law with religious legitimacy. The new Mudawana, introduced in 2003, has had
important consequences for Moroccans abroad. An example of a new measure with
far-reaching consequences is that the children of Moroccan women (married to a non-
Moroccan man) are automatically Moroccan as well. The renewal of the Mudawana
has not only strengthened the religious underpinnings of the ties between Moroccans
and the monarchy, but also the legal ties. Children of Moroccan parents automatically
acquire the Moroccan nationality, and as it is not possible to renounce this nationality19,
Dutchwomen and men of Moroccan descent all keep the Moroccan nationality. In this
way, religion, politics, and nationalism stay intertwined, and changes in the religious
field in Morocco may have a direct effect on Moroccans, also if they are born and
raised in the Netherlands.
When analyzing the Moroccan state’s efforts to use religious affiliations as a way to
tie Moroccans to the monarchy and the Dutch aim to prevent that, we cannot ignore the
agency of Moroccan-Dutch Muslims. During the last two decades, Dutch Muslim
youngsters started to look for ways to modernize Islam and to reconcile it with the
Dutch context. They would like to see imams preach in Dutch, in order to be
comprehensible for any Dutch Muslim. Many initiatives that are now being taken to
develop an Islam that is more rooted in the Netherlands are taken by Dutchmen of
Moroccan descent. They play an important role in the emergence of a Muslim civil
society and they actively take part in debates about the position of Islam in Dutch
society. The European Council for Moroccan Ulama, founded in 2009, might have
played a role in the renewal of the Dutch Moroccan-Muslim landscape, but it does not
seem to make much effort to connect to the ongoing changes. The Moroccan ministry
of Religious Affairs does not seem to follow up on these developments, or at least not
19 While it is in theory possible to renounce to the Moroccan nationality for those who do not have a
Moroccan father (see Perrin 2007), there are no known cases of Moroccans who have actually succeeded in
completing the legal procedure and receive a favorable response to their demand.
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quickly enough, and is losing foothold. Until now, the Ulama Council has
organized a few activities, such as lectures and conferences about religious
topics, but it has not been very visible yet; the main media attention it got
was at the beginning of 2013, when its members were accused of corrupt practices
(Tchounand 2012).
Moroccan-Dutch Muslims will more often refer to a global Islam for guidance and
thus further the development of a Dutch Islam. In 2013, Yassine Elforkani, a Dutch
preacher of Moroccan origin, was criticized for accepting financial support and advice
from the ministry of Islamic Affairs in Kuwait (Soetenhorst 2013). Dutch authorities
immediately expressed their concern about the influence of Kuwait on a Dutch mosque,
but this is actually a strong example of how Dutch Muslims do not exclusively turn
towards the state of their (parents’) country of origin anymore, but adhere to a
globalized Islam. By doing so, they are weakening state transnational practices,
replacing it by more private transnational practices.
Concluding remarks
From the moment the first migrants arrived in Europe, the governments of Turkey and
Morocco have been involved in the lives of their subjects in Europe. Apart from
individual material and financial ties that link migrants to their families back home,
there is a multiplicity of political and ideological, but also emotional links that bind
migrants to their home countries in which states play a crucial role. In this
article, we have addressed a very complex field, in this respect, Islam. We have
demonstrated that it would be a gross simplification to assume that state
activities and practices could be singled out and set apart from initiatives taken
by ordinary Muslims. Islam in Europe and the ways in which it developed is
historically, socially, politically, and culturally connected to developments in the
countries of origins and increasingly also with the rest of the Islamic world.
The cases we have addressed in this article demonstrate this very clearly, but at
the same time, the relationships and transnational networks that Muslim com-
munities in Europe develop and maintain have their own dynamics.
As we have seen, it is impossible to disentangle grassroot practices from those
pertaining to the state. This is not because we cannot separate two modes of activity
from each other analytically, but because these belong to the same transnational field
and refers to overlapping practices and imaginaries. Although the two states that are
discussed here have a political agenda depending on the evolving political climate over
the course of years, the two cases also demonstrate how state and private practices,
networks and initiatives are often and mutually depended. We cannot understand the
initiatives developed by the state if we ignore their intricate relation and connectedness
with grassroot initiatives and vice versa. On the other hand, it would also be simplifying
to conflate both spheres. Activities related to Islam perfectly demonstrate how state and
private activities intermingle and overlap.
When we look at the developments of religion as a complex transnational field of
activity over a longer period, there are some striking similarities between the Turkish
and Moroccan case. In both cases, religious affiliation is a very complex source of
binding but also of fission. State monitored transnational networks have been tools of
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binding, but the same networks have engendered processes of disengagement from the
state. This is certainly the case with Turkey and the extended organizational structure in
Europe, but also the fragmented Moroccan religious landscape in the Netherlands
makes the relations complex. They have developed into transnational social fields with
their own dynamics, of which state initiatives constitute an integral part.
There are a number of factors that account for that. One is, of course, the changing
characteristics of the Muslim population in Europe. From a poorly educated migrant
population with a weak social position and strong familial ties with the country of
origin, they have developed into a group of people for whom the ties with the country
of their parents or grandparents is not unidirectional and unambiguous anymore. The
other reason for the changing position of the Turkish and Moroccan states concerns the
evolving characteristics of transnational networks. Contemporary transnational activi-
ties are increasingly based on a cultural sense of belonging. At the outset, we have
argued that there is no contradiction between the continuation of transnational networks
and rooting of migrants in societies of settlement. We have refuted the idea that Turkish
and Moroccan governments frustrate “normal” integration processes of their subjects
by monitoring their subjects abroad. Even if this would be the aim, it is limited and
conditioned by developments in the migrant communities. The Turkish and Moroccan
Islamic landscapes in Europe can only be properly understood as a part of the existing
transnational fields of which the respective states are an intricate part and not an
external force.
We have also argued that the externalization and deregulation of state interventions
has changed the modes of involvement. The nation-state is a cultural project. In the case
of Turkey, the complex historical relation between Turkishness and Islam has deeply
impacted on how the Turkish Islamic landscape in Europe has developed. In the case of
Moroccan Islam, political struggles and state security issues have deeply impacted on
the Moroccan Islamic landscape in Europe.
There are also important differences between the two cases we have analyzed. The
most fundamental is, of course, the historically grown difference between the state and
religion in both countries. This has impacted on the ways in which nationhood
and religious affiliation are intertwined. A related aspect concerns the differ-
ences in the Netherlands between the two communities. The Moroccan Islamic
landscape is much more fragmented than the Turkish. This is highly relevant
for the ways in which the respective states connect to these landscapes in the
Netherlands.
In this article, we have demonstrated that statecraft in transnational fields, rather than
just being a dominant force, is itself situational and contingent upon the lives of its
subjects. Our cases reveal two (seemingly contradictory) developments: on the
one hand, we see that the Islamic landscape in Netherlands (as in other
European countries) increasingly operates according to local dynamics and
becomes less dependent on agents in the countries of origin to determine their
agendas. On the other hand, a relatively wealthy, well-educated and mobile
middle class has emerged among Muslims in Europe. Due to the rapid spread
of modern mass media, transnational networks have proliferated, producing a
multiplicity of forms and modes with which Muslims sustain relations across
borders. Consequently, states have to redefine their role in the Dutch institutional
landscape on a constant basis.
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